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Frequent protests, arising from a diversity of motivations, are a feature of the South African 
landscape. Despite the right to protest being entrenched in section 17 of the Constitution, it is 
under threat, and communities seeking to protest increasingly risk criminalisation. This article 
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There should be little need for protest in 
a functioning participatory democracy.1 
Yet protest is an entrenched part of the 
South African psyche, and a core tactic of 
activists pushing for change of all kinds. In 
South Africa, protest is not just a tactic of 
revolution, but a protected human right. 
Nevertheless, protesters often risk arrest 
and criminalisation, given that protest is 
frequently a means of last resort, used when 
frustrated communities can no longer justify 
continued fruitless attempts at engagement.2 
Part one of this article touches briefly on 
the drivers of protest, while part two sets 
the scene with an outline of the regulatory 
system applicable to protest. Part three 
examines various ways in which the right to 
protest is being suppressed. Lastly, part 
four discusses the role of the public interest 
legal sector in responding to these attempts 
at suppression.
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Part one: Drivers of protest 
South Africa has a rich history of organised civil 
disobedience and social mobilisation, which 
were used as a tool against the apartheid 
regime.3 Today’s protesters thus tap into a 
protest culture that dates back to the struggles 
against exploitation and oppression under 
apartheid.4 Much has been written about 
the causes of protests in South Africa. While 
initially the dominant narrative was that of 
service delivery protests, fuelled largely by the 
way in which protests were reported by the 
mainstream media, our understanding of the 
drivers of protest activity has now deepened. 
Today we understand that in addition to 
dissatisfaction with inadequate provision of 
services, people in South Africa protest because 
of discontent with the ineffectiveness of the 
available channels of participatory democracy5 
and because of community alienation stemming 
from a neglect of ‘bottom-up’ planning and 
consultative processes.6 Protests are also 
the result of billing issues,7 labour matters 
such as salaries and improvement of working 
conditions,8 community members seeking out 
alleged criminals, attempts to highlight causes 
such as environmental injustice or homophobia, 
or to express solidarity with pro-democracy 
protests in places like Egypt.9 More recently, 
there have also been controversial protests 
calling for the removal of the president. The 
South African picture of frequent protests 
arising from a diversity of motivations is clear. 
How then does this reality interact with the legal 
protection of protest?
Part two: What the law says
Section 17 of the Constitution provides 
that ‘everyone has the right, peacefully and 
unarmed, to assemble, to demonstrate, to 
picket, and to present petitions’. The legislative 
accompaniment to section 17 is the Regulation 
of Gatherings Act 203 of 1995 (the Gatherings 
Act), which came into operation at the dawn 
of South Africa’s democracy following the 
Goldstone Commission of Inquiry’s attempt to 
bring South Africa’s assembly jurisprudence in 
line with international practice.10 Reflecting the 
language of section 17, the preamble to the 
Gatherings Act recognises that ‘every person has 
the right to assemble with other persons and to 
express his views on any matter freely in public 
and to enjoy the protection of the State while 
doing so’. However, this right is qualified by the 
duty to protest ‘peacefully and with due regard to 
the rights of others’.11  
In one of the leading cases on protest – South 
African Transport and Allied Workers Union 
and Another v Garvas and Others12 (Garvas) 
– the Constitutional Court acknowledged that 
the right to protest is central to South Africa’s 
constitutional democracy, as it exists primarily to 
give a voice to groups that do not have political 
or economic power. This right will, in many cases, 
be the only mechanism available to them to 
express their legitimate concerns. In the minority 
judgment in Garvas, Justice Chris Jafta held 
that ‘[i]t is through the exercise of the section 17 
rights that civil society and other similar groups 
in our country are able to influence the political 
process, labour or business decisions and even 
matters of governance and service delivery’.13  
Similarly, in S v Mamabolo, the court reaffirmed 
the position that freedom of expression is now 
‘an inherent quality’ of an open and democratic 
society, including freedom of assembly as 
provided for in the Bill of Rights.14 In South 
African National Defence Union v Minister of 
Defence and Others, the court captured the value 
of the right to protest as including its instrumental 
function as a guarantor of democracy, its implicit 
recognition and protection of the moral agency 
of individuals in our society, and its facilitation 
of the search for truth by individuals and 
society generally.15 The right to protest is thus 
firmly entrenched in South Africa’s democratic 
dispensation, at least in terms of legal regulation.
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Part three: Emerging themes in the 
protest landscape
Despite this legal protection, communities and 
the civil society organisations that support them 
routinely face obstruction from municipalities 
seeking to deny ‘permission’ for protest –
notwithstanding the fact that the Gatherings 
Act only requires communities to notify the 
local authorities, not to ask their permission. In 
addition, when protests do go ahead, police 
response is often disproportionately violent, 
and protesters and innocent bystanders alike 
risk arrest for spurious reasons. As one author 
has put it, the ‘right to peacefully protest is 
being swallowed by manipulative bureaucratic 
practices and violent policing practices’.16 The 
political space held open by the existence of 
the right to protest is thus closing as a result of 
violations of this right.  
In the next section we discuss some of the 
ways in which the right to protest is being 
suppressed, so as to identify emerging themes 
in the protest landscape. While this article does 
not seek to provide a comprehensive account 
of the tools of repression used by different 
state actors to quash protest, four dominant 
themes are highlighted through the lens of the 
experiences of the public interest legal sector. 
These are: the conflation of notification and 
permission; heavy-handed state responses to 
protests; the abuse of bail procedures; and the 
use of interdicts.
Notification versus permission
One of the key challenges facing protesters 
in South Africa is that the municipal officials 
tasked with administering the Gatherings Act 
frequently misunderstand its provisions, or 
deliberately apply them improperly. Municipal 
officials routinely operate on the basis that 
the conveners of a protest are required by 
the Gatherings Act to ask for permission to 
protest when this is in fact not the case. The 
requirement is notification, not consent. The 
Gatherings Act requires municipalities to be 
involved in the administration of the right to 
protest but does not require them to provide 
consent for such protests. Local officials thus 
substitute an obligation to facilitate protest 
with a right to veto.17 As emphasised in the 
Local Government Briefing Note, ‘[t]he notice 
of a gathering should not be seen as an 
“application”. Municipalities may, in principle, not 
refuse gatherings to take place.’18 Furthermore, 
in Garvas19 the Constitutional Court seems also 
to indicate that the Gatherings Act envisages 
a process of notification and administration of 
logistics, rather than permission-seeking.20
The provisions of the Gatherings Act specify 
that the only grounds on which a protest can 
lawfully be prevented by the municipality before 
the protest has commenced is if less than 48 
hours’ notice is given,21 or if the gathering poses 
a threat of injury to participants or others, or 
a threat of extensive damage to property or 
of serious disruption of traffic, and the South 
African Police Service (SAPS) is not equipped 
to contain that threat.22 Even then, a reasonable 
suspicion of violence is not enough. There must 
be credible information, submitted under oath 
in an affidavit. Importantly, neither the purpose 
of the protest nor past indiscretions by the 
group organising it are relevant considerations. 
The validity of a prohibition thus stands or falls 
on the ability of the SAPS to provide security. 
In addition, if the municipality suspects that 
a gathering may need to be prohibited, the 
prescribed meeting between the conveners, 
the SAPS and the municipality23 must still occur 
in good faith in order to explore whether any 
solutions exist. If, after all that, there is still no 
way to ensure adequate containment of the 
credible threat supported by evidence on oath, 
reasons must be provided for prohibition.24  
Notwithstanding this extremely high threshold 
outlined in the law, the current situation is that a 
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community seeking to protest lawfully by going 
through the process set out in the Gatherings 
Act should steel themselves for the likelihood 
that they will be rebuffed and obstructed by 
either the municipality, the SAPS, or both.25 
Whether this is due to a lack of training, or a 
more sinister deliberate ‘misinterpretation’,26 
the effect is the same. In fact, this misguided 
imposition of a permission-seeking process 
by municipalities has led to many aspirant 
protesters seeking instead to fall outside the 
bureaucratic bounds of the Gatherings Act by 
protesting in groups of fewer than 15 people 
(which does not require prior notice), a strategy 
also employed during apartheid.
Heavy-handed state response to protest
Although the right to protest remains protected 
as long as those who engage in protest do so 
peacefully and are unarmed, a further challenge 
facing protesters is the repressive and hostile 
response from state authorities, primarily the 
police, once a protest goes ahead. In the 
previous section we discussed attempts by 
municipal officials, and sometimes also by the 
SAPS, to prevent protests from happening. Here 
we turn to attempts to disperse protests when 
they occur, and to impose severe penalties for 
participating in protest activity.  
This is well-illustrated by the arrest (and regional 
court conviction) of a group of 94 community 
healthcare workers in the Free State for 
their attendance at a night vigil outside the 
headquarters of the Department of Health. The 
workers had gathered at Bophelo House in 
protest against their dismissal and the generally 
unsatisfactory conditions in the provincial health 
care system.27 The community healthcare 
workers were convicted of contravening section 
12(1)(e) of the Gatherings Act, i.e. ‘convening 
a gathering, or attending a gathering or 
demonstration prohibited in terms of the Act’.
In November 2016 the appellants were 
acquitted on appeal, in an important judgment 
that makes it clear that it is not a crime to 
attend a gathering simply because notice 
was not provided. It expressly states that a 
gathering in regard to which notice was not 
provided is not ‘illegal’ or ‘prohibited’ and it 
also confirms that the Gatherings Act, while 
requiring notice, does not require ‘consent’.28 
Among the several practical consequences of 
the court’s decision is that police who arrive at 
an un-notified gathering are now duty-bound 
to liaise with and protect attendees, as well 
as the public, and to facilitate the exercise of 
the right rather than to simply disperse the 
crowd or make arrests. In recognising that the 
Gatherings Act ‘replaced a host of statutes 
promulgated in the apartheid era, (which) 
were widely regarded as being of a draconian 
nature’29 the judgment may impact positively 
on a move away from the criminalisation of 
protesters and pave the way for an important 
shift from the past (and current) ‘iron-fist 
approach toward protest action’.30  
Another important protest court case heard in 
2017 was the appeal against the conviction of 
21 activists who were arrested at a peaceful 
protest outside the offices of Cape Town Mayor 
Patricia de Lille in September 2013 while 
demonstrating against the state of sanitation in 
the city.31 In February 2015, 10 of the activists 
involved in the protest were convicted of 
convening and attending an illegal gathering. 
The activists had decided that 15 people 
would protest, and accordingly it would not be 
necessary to issue notification in terms of the 
Gatherings Act. They chained themselves to 
the railings on the steps at one entrance to the 
Civic Centre. There was no intention to block 
access to the building, and people were able 
to pass under the chains. The situation was 
thus described:
There were 15 of us chained when the 
picket started, but the number grew when 
people arrived and started singing along 
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with us. Then there were also members 
who were carrying placards and some 
had brought us water. [There were about 
20 to 30 police members at the scene 
at different times,] who came with tools 
used to cut padlocks and chains and they 
started cutting aggressively and pushed us 
in a group towards the police van. Other 
people were arrested as well who were not 
part of the chain.32 
The Social Justice Coalition argued that section 
12(1)(a) of the Gatherings Act criminalises 
a gathering of more than 15 people just 
because no notice was given and therefore 
unjustifiably limits the right to protest and is 
unconstitutional.33 The appeal was heard in the 
Western Cape High Court in June 2017 and 
judgment was pending at the time of writing.
These examples are demonstrative of the 
routine police response of quashing peaceful 
protests where they may be, at worst, merely 
disruptive. Research by the University of 
Johannesburg’s Social Change Research Unit 
distinguishes between peaceful, disruptive and 
violent protests.34 Jane Duncan’s research, 
published in Protest nation, reveals that the vast 
majority of protests are in fact peaceful and take 
place without incident.35 The state response to 
protests – whether peaceful protests or those 
that may turn violent – is similar, characterised 
by heavy-handed actions that include violence 
perpetrated against protesters. In the experience 
of the Centre for Applied Legal Studies 
(CALS), police response to protest is often 
disproportionately violent and protesters and 
innocent bystanders alike risk arrest on spurious 
grounds. This kind of excessive force used 
against protesters in order to repress disruptive 
protest is also often then misrepresented as 
public violence.36 
Apart from at a protest itself, heavy-handed 
and violent police responses are also a feature 
in ‘protest hotspot areas’. The Thembelihle 
informal settlement, adjacent to Lenasia in 
Johannesburg, is one such site where there have 
been unyielding struggles for basic services over 
the last 15 years, in the face of little meaningful 
government response.37 This has increasingly 
led to police quashing protest, and even the 
imposition of de facto, if unofficial, states of 
emergency. During February 2015 scores of 
residents were arrested following spontaneous 
protests. The SAPS and other security agents 
placed the township on lock-down, patrolling 
the streets, breaking up gatherings of more than 
three people, and harassing individual activists.38
As in many areas, the Thembelihle experience 
demonstrates that rather than being responsive 
to the needs and rights of its residents, 
government is prepared to use repression and 
police brutality to stamp out protest. The heavy-
handed police response included the arrest 
of community leaders (not during protests but 
following raids in the settlement after the fact), 
notwithstanding the important role those leaders 
played in advocating for and restoring calm to 
a community desperate to be heard. The SAPS 
actions in making those arrests amounted to a 
display of power unconducive to restoring calm 
and responding to the eminently reasonable 
needs of the community. It is telling that some of 
the community leaders of the Thembelihle Crisis 
Committee who were arrested were the same 
leaders intervening to organise anti-xenophobia 
public meetings and stop such attacks just days 
before. They had even attempted to involve the 
SAPS in these responses and prevention.39
Defending the constitutionally protected 
right to protest against heavy-handed state 
actions aimed at quelling protest is not just 
about defending the right to protest. It is also 
about upholding the rule of law and holding 
government to account in a constitutional 
democracy. In this context, trends such as 
those highlighted above must be viewed 
extremely seriously.
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When law is used as an 
instrument of repression
The third way in which the right to protest is 
being suppressed is through the law itself – 
where the law is used as a weapon to 
stifle and demobilise, and is claimed by 
conservative powers in order to protect the 
status quo that protest is challenging. The two 
systemic examples of this in the protest 
context are the abuse of bail processes and 
the use of interdicts.
Abuse of bail processes
State officials routinely abuse the bail process to 
‘punish’ protesters or quash ongoing protests, 
and these tactics are used as an extension of 
arbitrary arrests of protesters. The state officials 
implicated here include the police, prosecutors 
and magistrates. Arrested protesters require 
assistance in procuring bail to avoid remaining 
in remand detention awaiting trial – stretches 
that can last potentially for many months and 
very often ultimately result in the withdrawal of 
the protest-related charges on the grounds that 
these charges could not be sustained. Arrestees 
require this assistance because the bail process 
is abused at various stages following arrest. 
These abuses include the unjustified denial 
of police or prosecutorial bail before a first 
appearance (which, if protesters are arrested 
just before a weekend, means they then spend 
a few days in custody); unreasonable delays and 
unjustifiable postponements before bail hearings; 
stringent conditions attached to bail aimed at 
quashing further (lawful) protest; and bail set in 
excessively high and unattainable amounts. 
All these tactics have been features of recent 
student protests, and are also well demonstrated 
in the case of a group of 17 residents of 
Marapong, Lephalale, who were charged with 
public violence and arson. The reasons for 
delays in the hearing of bail applications included 
postponements for ‘verification of address’ 
without proper explanation of why investigating 
officers had not yet done so, refusing to accept 
oral evidence of family members present 
in court as to the address of the accused, 
the unavailability of a magistrate, already 
overcrowded court rolls, and an investigating 
officer not being present to provide evidence 
for a prosecutor in opposing bail. CALS’s 
representation of the Lephalale residents 
documents systemic abuse of arrestees in 
places that are considered ‘protest hotspots’.40 
While section 50(6)(d) of the Criminal Procedure 
Act 55 of 1977 allows a court to postpone any 
bail proceedings ‘for a period not exceeding 
seven days at a time’,41 this provision is 
routinely used to frustrate bail applications at 
a first appearance, and even in subsequent 
weeks, without good grounds. Unless detained 
protesters are represented, repeated week-long 
postponements are not always interrogated 
by the court – perhaps because court rolls 
are extremely full, or due to a level of cynicism 
from the bench that may have developed in 
our criminal courts.42  These delays are often 
an abuse of process by prosecutors and 
investigating officers who are seeking to punish 
or remove perceived ‘trouble makers’ from 
active protests.
Once a bail application is argued, it is a two-
part inquiry – firstly into whether or not the 
interests of justice favour the release of an 
accused on bail, and secondly, if they do, 
what amount would be appropriate, taking all 
the circumstances of the matter into account, 
including what the individual can afford.43 The 
attitude of the court in Lephalale ran contrary to 
this legal position: before hearing any evidence 
or argument on behalf of the arrested people, 
the court demanded that they come with a 
serious proposal about the amount of bail they 
could afford because of the damage caused. 
Bail was set in the amount of R4 000 per 
person, which was shockingly inappropriate, 
given that the people concerned were mostly 
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him bail, at least partly on the basis that he had 
violated previous bail conditions by participating 
in protest action. He subsequently spent several 
months in detention at Durban’s Westville 
Prison. The Supreme Court of Appeal refused to 
hear his case48 and it eventually ended up in the 
Constitutional Court in March 2017.
Interrogating why he had been in custody for 
so long, Chief Justice Mogoeng Mogoeng 
asked: ‘[P]eople who are accused of rape 
get bail. People who are accused of murder 
get bail. What is it about this one?’ The chief 
justice further noted that thousands of people 
who perhaps should get bail are awaiting trial 
in remand.49 During the Constitutional Court 
hearing, the state finally agreed to release 
Khanyile on R250 bail – a welcome result, 
but one which should not have required legal 
intervention all the way to the Constitutional 
Court. This case is another clear illustration of 
the abuse of bail processes to make an example 
of a leader who is considered problematic by 
those in power. It also evidences how justice is 
so often ultimately only accessible for those 
with resources.
Use of interdicts
The use of interdicts to quash and prevent 
protest is a feature of the recent university 
protests, and is also gaining popularity as 
a tactic used by multinational corporations 
operating in South Africa against communities 
affected by mining. A prohibitory interdict is 
a court order instructing a party not to do 
something.50 Interdicts ought to prohibit unlawful 
conduct, and/or protect an established right 
of the applicant. The use of interdicts to quell 
lawful protest arguably does neither, and they 
are accordingly being used inappropriately by 
conservative forces. 
The use of interdicts by mining companies 
is well illustrated by an ex parte rule nisi 51 
that Platreef Resources obtained against the 
Kgobudi Traditional Community in May 2012. 
unemployed and surviving on meagre child 
support grants. Ultimately bail was reduced 
through further application to the court, but this 
meant a further delay.44
Even in 1972, in S v Budlender, 45 which 
concerned an appeal against both the amount 
and conditions of bail for two students charged 
under the draconian Riotous Assemblies Act, 
the Cape Provincial Division held as follows:
[T]here is the very important thing: The 
courts do not like ever to deprive a man 
of his freedom while awaiting trial. He may 
be innocent, and then it would be very 
wrong. Also, even if he is guilty, we try not 
to deprive a man of his freedom until he 
has been convicted. After all, even if you 
are sitting in gaol awaiting trial under the 
most favourable conditions in the gaol you 
are nevertheless deprived of your freedom. 
Therefore, when fixing the bail amount, we 
feel that this amount must be put within 
reach of the accused.’46 
A recurring theme in hotspots in magisterial 
districts is also the requests by prosecutors 
to magistrates to set conditions of bail that 
preclude accused individuals from taking part 
in any protests whatsoever upon their release, 
pending the outcome of their trials. We would 
argue, as CALS did in Lephalale, that such a 
limitation on the constitutional right to protest 
is unlawful and cannot stand. However, when 
arrested protesters do not have access to legal 
representation, the likelihood of onerous and 
arguably unlawful bail conditions increases.  
One of the most high-profile recent cases that 
illustrate such practices is that of Bonginkosi 
Khanyile, a #FeesMustFall activist from the 
Durban University of Technology (DUT), who 
was arrested in September 2016 during protest 
action at his university. He faced eight charges, 
including inciting violence, participating in an 
illegal gathering and public violence.47 Both the 
magistrates’ court and the high court denied 
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The rule nisi was granted against the Kgobudi 
Community as ‘a clan within the broader 
Mokopane Community, [who] live on farms in 
respect of which the applicant [Platreef] holds 
a prospecting right […] the applicant alleges 
that a mob of some 150 angry and violent 
members of Kgobudi Community marched 
on the drill-rigs and threatened violence if 
operations were not stopped.’52 In discharging 
the rule nisi, the court considered whether it 
was permissible for the mine to seek and obtain 
an interdict against an entire community, which 
in this case consisted of upwards of 15 000 
people.53 Additionally, community members 
were interdicted in the rule nisi from going within 
200 m of drilling equipment, despite such drilling 
sites and equipment being within 200 m of their 
homes. This ruling had the effect of a back-door 
eviction order against some residents from their 
communal land without any court-sanctioned 
eviction or compensation. 
The rule nisi was opposed on the return date 
by a group of affected community members 
represented by Lawyers for Human Rights. The 
court ultimately discharged the interim interdict, 
relying on what arguably ought to be settled law 
by now, namely that:
A notification to persons in general or to 
a group of individuals by way of Rule Nisi 
that the Court is about to pronounce a suit 
between parties is of course permissible. It 
is a procedure frequently adopted in order 
to give interested parties an opportunity 
of joining litigation. But it does not by 
itself, make them parties to the litigation 
and they do not merely, by virtue of being 
notified of the litigation become liable to 
be punished for contempt of Court, for 
failure to comply with any order which 
is eventually made. A failure to identify 
defendants, or respondents would seem 
to me to be destructive of the notion 
that a Court’s order operates only inter-
parties, not to mention questions of locus 
standi in jurico iudicio. An order against 
respondents, not identified by name or 
perhaps by individualised description, in 
the process commencing action or in very 
urgent cases, brought orally on the record, 
would have the generalised effect typical of 
legislation. It would be a decree and not a 
Court order at all.54
Notwithstanding these clear parameters in law, 
the universities of the Witwatersrand, Cape 
Town, Pretoria, Port Elizabeth, Rhodes and the 
Free State all sought and obtained interdicts 
against broad descriptions of unnamed students 
to prevent them from protesting during the 
recent student protests. These interdicts are 
problematic, for two reasons. Firstly, they often 
include orders that are so broad that it is not easy 
to discern conduct that is lawful from conduct 
that is not. Secondly, these interdicts arguably 
breach the principle of legality in that they seek 
to include vague, unnamed respondents who 
are not sufficiently described. It is difficult to 
understand how courts are willing to grant 
interim interdicts with broad descriptions that are 
unopposed, because it follows that because no 
one is named, they will be unopposed – for, in 
order to oppose such interdicts, some individuals 
would have to ‘volunteer’ themselves as 
engaged in ‘unlawful’ activity to enter the 
proceedings as respondents.55
One of these interdicts – obtained by ‘the 
University Currently Known as Rhodes’ on 20 
April 2016 – was challenged in the Grahamstown 
High Court by the Socio-Economic Rights 
Institute (SERI), representing both students and 
a group of concerned staff.56 The interim interdict 
initially restrained a wide variety of persons from 
‘encouraging, facilitating and/or promoting any 
unlawful activities’ at Rhodes University. This 
interim interdict applied to three named students, 
to the Student Representative Council of Rhodes 
University, and to a broad and amorphous mass 
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of people identified as ‘students of Rhodes 
University engaging in unlawful activities on the 
applicant’s campus’ or ‘those persons engaging 
in or associating themselves with unlawful 
activities on the applicant’s campus’. 
The interim interdict was granted after the 
court heard oral evidence from five members 
of Rhodes University’s management and 
administrative staff concerning protest action 
that was led and organised by women students 
at the university, against what the students 
believe is an organisational culture that 
condones and perpetuates rape and sexual 
violence against women.57 SERI and its clients 
argued that the requirements for interim or final 
interdicts were not met; that interdicts may 
not unjustifiably infringe on constitutional rights 
(which by their definition protect lawful conduct); 
and that court orders should be clear and 
unambiguous as a fundamental principle of the 
rule of law. 
The matter was heard in the Eastern Cape 
High Court on 3 November 2016. The high 
court discharged the interim interdict that had 
been granted in Rhodes University’s favour 
against all of the unnamed respondents, and 
was critical of the overbroad relief sought and 
the citing of unidentifiable groups.58 A narrower 
interdict was granted against three of the 
original respondents, who the court held acted 
unlawfully in some respects.59 SERI’s application 
for leave to appeal against that portion of the 
judgment was dismissed with costs, as was its 
petition to the Supreme Court of Appeal.60   
This meant that students who had participated 
in protests against rape culture stood to be 
held liable for a considerable sum of legal fees 
incurred by the university that had sought to 
prevent them from protesting. The matter was 
subsequently appealed to the Constitutional 
Court. In a judgment handed down on 7 
November 2017, the Constitutional Court 
dismissed the appeal on the merits, but upheld 
the appeal against the costs order. In dismissing 
the costs order against the students, the court 
pointed out that ‘one needs to be careful not 
to create a perception that the applicants were 
being admonished for seeking leave to appeal’.61
The granting of overly broad interdicts seems to 
be on the rise. However, in at least some of the 
instances where that overbroadness in interim 
interdicts is challenged – as in the Mokopane and 
Rhodes cases discussed above – the resulting 
final interdict is more appropriately narrowly 
fashioned. What is clear is that considerably 
more scrutiny of the relationship between 
interdicts and the right to protest is required.
Part four: The role of public 
interest lawyers
The discussion above has highlighted a number 
of the challenges facing those seeking to 
exercise the right to protest in South Africa today, 
despite the constitutional protection of this right. 
We have also highlighted how sometimes the law 
and legal instruments are used as the very tools 
to suppress protest. Law has therefore become 
at least one of the sites of contestation in the 
protest arena. It is consequently both useful 
and necessary to interrogate the role of lawyers 
in such contestation. A full discussion of this is 
beyond the scope of this article, but we offer 
some reflections on the role played by the public 
interest legal sector in relation to protest.
In the honeymoon period immediately following 
the transition to democracy, protest died down 
significantly and at that time little attention was 
paid to the Gatherings Act.62 But gradually the 
shine on the rainbow began to dim, and activists 
began to turn once again to protest as a strategy 
to challenge power. By the early 2000s there 
was a widespread perception among civil society 
that opportunities for participation in structures 
like policy forums and public participation 
processes were in decline.63 As the prevalence 
of protest began to increase, so too did calls 
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from protesting communities for assistance from 
lawyers in the public interest legal sector. 
In spite of the fact that protests are so central 
to South Africa’s politics, there has not been 
a coordinated system in place to support 
protesters. In the struggle against apartheid, 
human rights lawyers were well versed in 
criminal law; providing representation for their 
activist comrades in criminal proceedings was 
an everyday part of their work. However, after 
the transition to democracy, criminal justice work 
ceased to be a focus of many organisations 
practising public interest law, as the need for this 
kind of legal work died down in that honeymoon 
phase. This shift can also be attributed to donor 
funding that emphasises strategic litigation 
(where precedent-setting cases are likely to 
have an impact beyond the parties to the case) 
rather than direct legal services (the day-to-
day business of legal support to those who 
cannot afford a private sector lawyer, such as 
conducting a bail application).64 
However, in the past few years there has 
been a resurgence of the need for this kind 
of direct legal service support to communities 
across South Africa. Law-focused civil society 
organisations are increasingly requested 
to assist with negotiations around section 
4 meetings,65 bail applications for arrested 
protesters, subsequent criminal trials, and 
even damages claims pertaining to malicious 
prosecution and police brutality. While many 
civil society organisations have recently begun 
working on protest-related issues again, this 
work has not always been coordinated, and 
the capacity of these organisations is often 
outstripped by the demand. In many cases, 
requests for help are met with the response 
that organisations do not do criminal work (both 
because this expertise has largely been lost and 
because their funding streams do not support 
this kind of work). This has led to increasing 
anger from communities across the country, 
perhaps most acutely in communities affected 
by mining, directed towards their colleagues in 
human rights-focused organisations. Gradually, 
there have been shifts in the sector, in part for 
reasons of strategic value, but also because 
there is an overwhelming need. More and 
more non-governmental organisations have 
resuscitated their expertise in criminal law – 
for example, Lawyers for Human Rights, the 
Legal Resources Centre, the Socio-Economic 
Rights Institute, Section27, Equal Education 
Law Centre, ProBono.org and CALS have all 
started engaging in more protest-related and 
criminal work.66
The #FeesMustFall protests in 2015 were also 
a powerful catalyst for this shift. Within two 
weeks of #FeesMustFall becoming a national 
movement, lawyers in the social justice sector 
had banded together to run a coordinated 
hotline for arrested students seeking legal 
assistance. Through the development of 
relationships with the National Association of 
Democratic Lawyers (NADEL), Legal Aid and 
many lawyers in the private sector who were 
keen to contribute their expertise in support of 
the movement, legal assistance was deployed 
to support protesting students across the 
country. While this started out as a crisis 
response, it has proved enormously valuable 
in highlighting gaps. For example, many 
human rights lawyers had to learn how to 
conduct bail applications on the trot, with the 
sector mobilising to ensure skills transfer and 
training across organisations where necessary. 
Experienced social justice lawyers conducted 
training for private attorneys who wanted to 
assist but who were not well-versed in bail 
processes or representing large, politicised 
groups of clients. The effect of this kind of legal 
mobilisation was that by the time the second 
wave of #FeesMustFall protests broke out in 
2016, the public interest legal sector was far 
better equipped to provide effective support to 
protesting students. 
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In addition, these events gave rise to a coalition 
called the Right2Protest Project (R2P), by 
catapulting the collaboration between various 
civil society organisations into the formal 
establishment of an organisation aimed at 
advancing the constitutional right to protest.67 
R2P has a full-time attorney on hand to provide 
legal representation to protesters – whether in 
bail applications, section 4 meetings, reviews 
of municipal decisions to ‘refuse permission’ 
to protest, student disciplinary enquiries 
resulting from protest, or any other relevant 
legal proceedings. The organisation also runs 
a national toll-free hotline68 through which the 
project provides legal support to protesting 
communities.69 In addition to the direct legal 
assistance, R2P provides a platform for 
collaboration and information-sharing. R2P 
is one of many welcome developments in 
the protest space: the coalition’s significance 
lies in the fact that it is borne out of both 
the recognition of the right to protest and 
the growing need to protect that right. The 
coalition also responds to critical gaps in the 
work of the public interest law sector.
Conclusion
Protest is embedded in the fabric of South 
Africa and the contemporary political climate. It 
is also intricately linked to South Africa’s history 
of civil disobedience and social mobilisation. 
Although protest is a constitutionally 
protected right, its realisation is impeded by 
the use of law for repressive purposes when 
protesters are erroneously required to apply 
for permission to protest, when bail processes 
are abused, when interdicts are captured, 
and when the state responds to protests in a 
heavy-handed manner.
Progressive lawyers therefore have a 
responsibility to claim back the law. Bad 
law must be challenged, and cases such as 
Tsoaeli, Mlungwana and the Rhodes interdict 
are examples of welcome interventions. It is 
critical that we abandon a ‘business as usual’ 
approach in favour of finding more creative ways 
of lawyering, including collaboration with partners 
outside of the legal sector. Furthermore, given 
that many of the abuses highlighted in cases 
such as Lephalale and Mokopane are taking 
place in magistrates’ courts, the sector needs to 
work in these spaces rather than always focusing 
on more glamorous Constitutional Court cases. 
While the need for strategic litigation remains, 
these legal interventions must be complemented 
by a return to the pre-constitutional approaches 
of being responsive to community requests for 
direct legal assistance in remote police stations 
and rural magistrates’ courts.  
Organisations such as R2P cannot be the 
sole solution to the issues raised above. The 
organisation’s establishment does, however, 
signal a shift in civil society responses to 
community needs. R2P is an experimental 
project, which will require constant reflection, 
self-critique and guidance from protesters 
themselves. It will also hopefully aid the project 
of claiming back the law and putting the law to 
use in advancing the right to protest.
To comment on this article visit 
http://www.issafrica.org/sacq.php
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